

**Deterrence through
Transformation**

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Indicators of Successful Institutional Reform Applicable to Defense Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe

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“Who Ya Gonna Believe, Me or Your Own Eyes?”

—*Chicolini*, in ‘Duck Soup,’ played by ‘Chico’ Marx, Brother of Groucho, et al., ‘I fratelli pazzi’

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Introduction

- Since the end of the Cold War, most countries in CEE have attempted to reform their institutions of governance
 - Success has range from various degrees of success (e.g., Estonia), to other cases where states are still mired in communist governance concepts
 - Defence institutions stand out as having faced many challenges to reform
 - Civil ministries have clear guideposts and expected outcomes for those aspiring to EU membership
 - *Acquis Communautaire*
 - But what of defence institutions?
 - The obvious answer: NATO
 - However, NATO does not/not address national business, i.e., how an MoD is structure and operates?
 - NATO is interested in defence *outcomes*
 - Membership Action Plans and other partner reforms guidance policies and programmes have produced uneven results and few success stories
- At its heart, the challenge is to *change institutional concepts*

Challenge of the Conceptual Divide

Western concepts	Legacy concepts
• Practical • De-centralised execution • Results oriented • Future focuses • Low context is needed • Low power distance • Take chances • Initiative rewarded • Serve the troops • Lying is not an option • Failure is part of learning • The work is a profession • Active participation required • Builds on planning	• Theoretical • Centralised execution • Process oriented • Past oriented • High contextual environment • High power distance • Uncertainty avoidance • Initiative is condemned • Ignore troops' welfare • Lying is not a sin • Failure is not an option • The work is for personal reward • Mere presence is adequate • Builds on scheduling

**N.B.: They are
mutually-exclusive**

Indicators of Defence Governance Reform

- How can objective criteria be applied to determine the degree to which a defence institution has dropped communist concepts and replaced them with their Western/modern counterparts?
- There are indeed such criteria which can be organised in the following categories
 1. Institutional management
 2. Policy framework
 3. Defence planning
 4. Style of command
 5. Human capital
 6. Legacy equipment
 7. Training methods
 8. Logistics
 9. Leadership/decision-making
- Combined, these criteria can show where change has and has *not* happened
- Critically: one can also discern 'red flags' indicating the lack of real change

Institutional Management

- Institutional respect for human rights of all personnel: military and civilian
- A Ministry of Defence is a civil ministry led and operated largely by civilian defence officials and experts
- Organisations have chiefs of staff in order to divide leadership / command from the daily management of the organisation
- Desk officer principle is followed: Officials charged with responsibilities 'own' their areas of responsibility and are accountable to meet performance expectations
- Decisions are made by individual officials (not groups / staffs) who are accountable for them
- Decision-making is pushed downwards to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, and to 'grow' leaders

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ Military officials making political / policy decisions
- ❑ Senior officials bring upwards decision-making authority in all matters
- ❑ Defence officials not challenging 'legacy' military advice

Policy Framework

- Defence officials establish political / policy goals and identify *costed* priorities to fund
- Policy is money; ergo money spent is ‘policy’
 - The two are not always connected in some defence institutions
 - Document claims policies, but the budget does not fund them
- Policy decisions must be accompanied with estimated financial costs
- All actions and activities of a defence organisation must conform to these established priorities
 - Those that do not, are not authorised to exist (i.e., no funding, no personnel)
- Military advice is taken for what it is: Only advice

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ The publication of repetitive, vague, and irrelevant ‘strategy’ documents that do not address how to optimise defence spending
- ❑ The general staff controls planning and execution with little civilian oversight
- ❑ Promotions and command assignments are not tightly controlled by the MoD

Defence Planning

- All defence plans are based on objective costing methods which include 'Total Life Cost' of all capability
- With input and professional advice from the military, defence planning is tightly controlled by the MoD's Policy Director
- Cost estimates are derived from models and their data must be unclassified
- Defence plans are informed by partially meeting war plans
 - A careful balance is needed to ensure that emerging technologies and threats are assessed and actioned

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ Uncosted plans developed by the general staff that look backwards, e.g., based on Soviet-era mobilisation plans
- ❑ Plans based on non-existent force structure
- ❑ Plans that do not address shortcomings in the current structure of the armed forces

Style of Command

Western approach:

Red flags:

Mission Command	Versus	Detailed Command
Unpredictable	Assumes war is	Predictable
Disorder / uncertainty	Accepts	Order / Certainty
De-centralization Informality Loose rein on subordinates Self-discipline Initiative Co-operation Ability at all echelons Higher tempo	Tends to lead to	Centralization Formality Tight rein on subordinates Imposed discipline Obedience Compliance Ability only at the top
Implicit Vertical / horizontal Interactive	Types of communications	Explicit Vertical Linear
Organic Ad hoc	Organization types fostered	Hierarchic Bureaucratic
Delegating	Leadership styles	Directing
Art of war	Appropriate to	Science of war

Human Capital

- The most valuable asset in a defence force is its personnel
- If one has the wrong human capital, even world-class capabilities can assure the achievement of national objectives
- Soldiers, sailors, airmen, civilian must be *allowed and required to think* in order to do their jobs
- Leaders must be grown and this requires working stressful assignments with high performance expectations
 - Decentralising decision-making to junior leaders is an essential requirement
- Personnel cannot be allowed to stay in one posting, but must be rotated in order to provide them with opportunities to learn new skills, grow and become competitive for promotions and command / leadership assignments

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ Professional soldiers are treated as conscripts and abused (e.g., mowing grass)
- ❑ Officers are not allowed to make decisions without approval from above
- ❑ NCOs are not empowered to do their assigned tasks of training and leadership

Legacy Equipment

- Soviet/Russian equipment (i.e., weapons, platforms, systems) are designed to ensure that mission command and individual initiative *can never be used*
- Legacy equipment will not allow the adoption of modern / western styles command and warfare, e.g., combined arms and manoeuvre
- Modernisation of legacy equipment is difficult, time-consuming, expensive, and will not produce world-class capabilities
- This kit ties operational planning and the way of warfare to Soviet military thinking, ca. 1944 (i.e., *Operation Plan Bagration*)
- Soviet/Russian doctrine requires that legacy platforms and weapons be employed in mass with the element of surprise

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ Armed forces keeping outdated and outmoded legacy equipment
- ❑ Lack of modernisation or drawing on new Russian / PRC military equipment
- ❑ Continuing the use of legacy equipment to avoid adopting new command styles and tactics

Western MRFA vs Soviet/Russian Aircraft: Irreconcilable Differences

Western MRFA	Soviet/Russian 'Combat Aircraft'
Pilot-centric	Ground-based radar-centre C2
Pilots are empowered to make decisions, e.g., rules of engagement (ROE)	Pilots only fly aircraft and decisions are made 'collectively' with ground-based radar C2
Life-span: 9,000 to 10,000 flying hours	Life-span: 2,000-3,000 flying hours
Flexibility in operations/missions designed into aircraft	Mission-limited
Air bases provide Levels 1 and 2 maintenance functions to ensure high FMC rates	Maintenance is largely provided by defence industry
Airframes hours and engines (total accumulated cycles) are managed separately	Aircraft are designed as a single platform
Many are designed to engage multi-targets at range	Traditionally highly specialised, but the trend is to become multi-role, e.g., the Sukoi-25 and the newer Sukoi-35
Requires institutional de-centralisation	Reinforces centralisation of all elements of control

Training Methods

- A key concept employed by European communist governance was universal conscription
- *Dedovshchina* was widely practiced and can still be seen in many legacy militaries
- The consequent implications for individual and collective training was to employ training to time, and not to striving for continuous improvement
- Problem with legacy training methods:
 - Leaders do not 'grow' (as they keep training to the same tasks to conscripts)
 - Soldiers are undertrained
 - Collective training is formalistic and scripted

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ *Dedovshchina*
- ❑ Training curricula does not change
- ❑ Lack of experimentation
- ❑ Scripted training, vice free-play exercises (e.g., Zapad, Vostok, etc.)

Logistics

- The hardest function in a military institution to change
- Logistical concepts and practices are inherently tied to the type of military equipment employed by a defence institution
- Soviet/Russian equipment is envisaged to be maintained in the 'Rear Area' in industrial depots and not / not in the field
 - Western-design equipment is designed to be maintained to the highest degree possible by units and specialised support formations to ensure high readiness of capabilities
- Legacy armed forces struggle to develop logistic support formations and train specialists
- Keeping legacy equipment encourages false economies: purchase costs may be lower, but one needs *more units*, experiences lower readiness, and spare-parts are expensive

❑ Red flags:

- ❑ Refusal to modernise with western equipment and associated modern logistics concepts
- ❑ Low readiness of legacy platforms, systems, weapons

Antithetical Logistics Concepts

Principles	Logistics	Rear Area (Security)
Guidance	Government policy	Военная доктрина (voennaya doktrina) "Military Doctrine"
Concepts	Supply, procurement, maintenance, private industry	Military Economic Science, design bureaux, government-owned defense industry
Determining demand	Government determines how much to spend	Armed forces determine what society must provide
Key assumption	De-centralized	Centralized
Customers	Lower level operational commanders	General Staffs, higher level operational commanders
Ownership	MoD/Defense staff/agencies	MoD, defense industry
Requirements determination	Operational commanders via the Estimate process	General Staff via centralized operational planning
Execution	"Pull" by commanders	"Push" by General Staff
Characteristics:	Flexibility, with inherent need to supply all units	Rigidity and predictability, allows battlefield exploitation, but abandons some units
	Maintenance is operationally focused	Maintenance is largely provided by defense industry and locked to it
	Software-based	Paper-based

Leadership and Decision-making

- All challenges to developing democratic defence governance can be linked to one legacy practice
 - Hyper-centralisation of decision-making
 - Non-transparent decision-making, external influence for pushing personnel interests, particularly in procurement and personnel/promotion decisions
- Cui bono?
 - Legacy leaders and their descendants
- Foundational challenge throughout CEE
 - How to address these legacy leaders who replicate themselves via promotions?
 - What are the incentives in governance norms that enable the inheritors of communist to rule?
- How to find and empower the right, Western-oriented leaders to press for needed reforms?

❑ **Red Flag:**

❑ Democratisation is, in the end, a *people problem* that needs to be solved

Conclusion

- Reform of communist legacy institutions has proven to be incredibly difficult in CEE
 - Few reform successes, e.g., Estonia
- Laws, regulations, paper documents alone cannot produce reform
- Impediments:
 - People
 - (*Homo Sovieticus*) is incredibly difficult to overcome in an institution
 - There is only one way to do anything
 - Thinking is forbidden and even punished
 - In the end: *people are policy*
 - Concepts
 - Soviet / communist institutional concepts *and their champions* need to be identified and removed
 - Introducing western / modern concepts on their own will not produce change
 - Avoid creating 'conceptual spaghetti'

□ One can monitor progress by assessing individual officials' behaviours

Questions?